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Abstract
Background: Medical device innovation remains poorly understood, and policymakers disagree over how to incentivize
early development. We sought to elucidate the components of transformative health care innovation by conducting an in-
depth case study of development of a key medical device: coronary artery stents.
Methods and Findings: We conducted semi-structured interviews with the innovators whose work contributed to the
development of coronary artery stents who we identified based on a review of the regulatory, patent, and medical
literature. Semi-structured interviews with each participant covered the interviewee’s personal involvement in coronary
artery stent development, the roles of institutions and other individuals in the development process, the interplay of
funding and intellectual property in the interviewee’s contribution, and finally reflections on lessons arising from the
experience. Transcripts were analyzed using standard coding techniques and the constant comparative method of
qualitative data analysis.
Conclusions: We found that the first coronary artery stents emerged from three teams: Julio Palmaz and Richard Schatz,
Cesare Gianturco and Gary Roubin, and Ulrich Sigwart. First, these individual physician-inventors saw the need for coronary
artery stents in their clinical practice. In response, they developed prototypes with the support of academic medical centers
leading to early validation studies. Larger companies entered afterwards with engineering support. Patents became
paramount once the technology diffused. The case of coronary stents suggests that innovation policy should focus on
supporting early physician-inventors at academic centers.
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Introduction
Medical device innovation is essential for the development of
new diagnostics and treatments for a wide range of conditions.
However, the emergence of transformative new medical devices
has slowed in recent years [1,2]. Strategies intended to stimulate
development have been offered [3,4], but a lack of a consensus
about the sources of innovation has stymied effective policy-
making. Indeed, despite the importance of breakthrough medical
technologies, the process of developing them remains poorly
understood [5]. For example, some legislators and industry
advocates argue that the best way to promote important new
device research and development is to reduce regulatory hurdles in
the US [6]. For this reason, the 2012 FDA Safety and Innovation
Act included a number of provisions intended to streamline review
of new devices [7].
A few studies have investigated the origins of transformative
medical devices [8]. Some have used patent records to document
the prominent role of individual physician-inventors [9,10].
However, the patent record may be incomplete because under-
lying discoveries may not have been patentable [11].
In the present analysis, we conducted a qualitative study of
transformative medical device innovation through structured
interviews with key innovators involved in the early development
of coronary artery stents, a technology that revolutionized
cardiology [5,12,13]. These devices are one of the most important
medical device innovations in the last 30 years [14], and exhibited
impressive diffusion from use in 5.4% of all percutaneous coronary
procedures in 1994 to 69% in 1997 despite the lack of a specific
Diagnosis Related Group code for stent implantation [15]. Our
goal was to identify the roles individuals and institutions played in
the inception and development of coronary artery stents, as well as
the challenges faced by innovators and the determinants that led to
technology’s successful implementation.
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A qualitative research approach makes it possible to investigate
motivations, reflections, and outcomes in a small cohort of subjects
who share a common experience [16]. We conducted semi-
structured interviews with the innovators whose work contributed
to the development of coronary artery stents; this technique has
been used previously to address fundamental questions relating to
the development and adoption of new medical technologies [8].
Based on a review of the regulatory, patent, and medical literature,
we targeted 37 potentially relevant innovators whose contact
information we could identify through public sources, including 6
high priority targets. Fourteen agreed—including all of our high
priority targets—while 2 declined. We identified two additional
participants through referrals. The study methodology was
approved by the institutional review board at Brigham and
Women’s Hospital. Participants provided verbal consent (written
consent was not deemed necessary by the institutional review
board), which was documented in the interviewer’s notes at the
beginning of the interview.
Semi-structured interviews with each participant covered four
main topic areas: the interviewee’s personal involvement in
coronary artery stent development, the roles of institutions and
other individuals in the development process, the interplay of
funding and intellectual property in the interviewee’s contribution,
and finally reflections on lessons arising from the experience.
Participants were asked to proceed chronologically through idea
conception, product development, testing, and approval. Next,
participants were asked to assess how academic medical centers,
various companies they interacted with, and government regula-
tory authorities were involved with the work at different stages in
the development. Third, participants were asked to recall how
each phase of the development process was funded (private vs.
industry vs. government), and whether patents were sought to
protect their intellectual contributions. Finally, participants were
asked to consider the roles of individual initiative, environmental
factors, serendipity vs. strategic planning, advances in science and
technology, and clinical need.
Median time for telephone interviews with participants was 40
minutes (range: 23–75). Both investigators took notes during the
interview, and interviews were recorded and later transcribed.
Interview transcripts were analyzed using standard coding
techniques [17] and the constant comparative method of
qualitative data analysis [18]. Based on a subset of 3 randomly
selected interviews, the investigators conducted independent
analysis and developed separate coding schemes for organizing
the data [19]. The coding schemes were then compared, discussed
and reconciled (NVIVO software package, QSR International,
Melbourne, Australia) to produce a final coding structure which
consisting of 7 broad themes (with 92 specific codes): (1)
antecedents of stent development, (2) timeline of stent develop-
ment, (3) key contributors to stent development, (4) the role of
intellectual property, (5) the role of academic medical centers, (6)
the role of device companies, and (7) other key characteristics of
the inventive process.
Results
Precedents for coronary artery stent innovation
Interviewees pointed to three antecedent developments that set
the stage for the development of coronary artery stents. The first
was the practice of dilating arteries using percutaneous angioplas-
ty, pioneered by Charles Dotter, a radiologist at the Oregon
Health and Science University in the 1960s. Dotter developed a
graduated catheter system with dilation by means of progressively
larger catheters. Dotter developed his early catheter prototypes
with the aid of Cook Inc, a small company founded by an early
medical entrepreneur, Bill Cook. The second major antecedent
was the development of percutaneous transluminal coronary
angioplasty (PTCA). Andreas Gruentzig, a German cardiologist
who came to Emory University in 1980, helped pioneer
angioplasty in the coronary arteries, primarily through the use of
an inelastic balloon [20]. A final key development mentioned by
participants was improvement in the manufacturing of catheters
required to deliver stents to the coronary arteries. Several
innovators cited John Simpson, a cardiologist at Stanford
University, who introduced a new catheter system that vastly
improved steerability. He founded ACS, a privately held medical
device company, to commercialize catheters and guidewires.
Coronary artery stent development
The first coronary artery stents emerged from three teams. Two
were US-based, with one led by Julio Palmaz and Richard Schatz,
and another by Cesare Gianturco and Gary Roubin. The third
was European-based led by Ulrich Sigwart. Each of the three
stents was developed with a different concept in mind and their
structures were completely different.
The Palmaz-Schatz stent. Argentina-trained radiologist
Julio Palmaz, attended a talk by Gruentzig at the Society of
Interventional Radiology Meeting in New Orleans in 1978. On
the taxicab ride back to the airport, Palmaz conceived of his initial
concept of the stent. Palmaz soon began fashioning his slotted tube
stents in his garage.
Palmaz moved to the University of Texas-San Antonio in 1980
to continue his work. With dedicated research time and laboratory
space, Palmaz finished animal studies of his stent, which he
presented at the Radiological Society of North America annual
meetings in 1984 and 1985. In 1985, Palmaz met Richard Schatz,
an interventional cardiologist conducting research at the South-
west Research Institute in San Antonio. Schatz made a
modification to Palmaz’s design to improve the stent’s flexibility
and introduced Palmaz to his friend Philip Romano, a restaura-
teur. Romano provided $250,000 in seed money and the three
formed Expandable Grafts Partnership (EGP) in late 1985 and
then filed the first patent application on the technology.
Prior to EGP, Palmaz unsuccessfully sought company partners.
However, with more mature technology and a business partner,
EGP licensed its intellectual property to Johnson & Johnson in
1986 for $10 million and a royalty percentage (6–9% on use in the
coronaries and 3–6% for peripheral use based on gross sales).
Johnson & Johnson provided engineering support for Palmaz and
Schatz and organized and funded the pivotal trials for US
premarket approval. Human experiments with the Palmaz-Schatz
stent occurred in peripheral arteries in 1987 and coronary arteries
in 1988. First sales of the stent came in Europe by 1988. The FDA
initially rejected the first Palmaz-Schatz stent application in 1993.
However, the team quickly reapplied and gained FDA approval in
August 1994 for the elective use of the Palmaz-Schatz stent for
restenosis on the basis of two pivotal trials (BENESTENT and
STRESS).
The Gianturco-Roubin stent. Cesar Gianturco was an
accomplished innovator in interventional radiology who did much
of his work at the Carle Clinic in Urbana, Illinois before becoming
a professor of experimental diagnostic surgery at the University of
Texas MD Anderson Hospital [21]. Gianturco had a long history
working with Cook Inc. having developed balloon-deployable
metallic stents and intravascular filters for peripheral vessels [22].
With funding and engineering support from Cook, Gruentzig
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develop a coronary stent based on Gianturco’s initial wire coil
designs. After Gruentzig’s untimely death in a plane crash, Roubin
continued the development, and after about a year started testing a
balloon-expandable flexible coil stent (Gianturco-Roubin Flex-
Stent). This stent was tested to treat acute vessel closure, a medical
emergency, following balloon angioplasty, and gained FDA
approval in early 1993 for this indication.
The Wallstent and Multilink stent. Ulrich Sigwart was a
cardiologist working at the Centre Hospitalier Universitaire
Vaudois in Lausanne, Switzerland. In the early 1980s, Sigwart
built self-expanding stents from an elastic wire braid, inspired by
cylindrical Chinese fingertraps made from woven strips of
bamboo. Initial prototypes and animal studies were supported
by the University’s experimental surgery department and a grant
from the Swiss National Fund. In 1985, Sigwart partnered with
MedInvent, a small private medical device company in Switzer-
land, to provide additional supplies and manufacturing and
engineering support for the stent, which was later named the
Wallstent. This work led to the first stent placement in the
coronary arteries of patients in Europe [23]. In 1986, MedInvent
was acquired by Schneider, a subsidiary of Pfizer, but the
company put development of the Wallstent on hold due to liability
concerns stemming from catastrophic mechanical failures in a
separate implantable cardiac product, the Bjork-Shiley heart
valve.
With Wallstent development at a standstill, Sigwart began to
work in 1989 with a small team at ACS, a private catheter focused
company, to pursue a balloon-expandable stent, leading to the
MultiLink stent. In 1993, the first Multilink stent was implanted in
a patient in London. In 1997, it was approved by the FDA and
quickly gained market dominance due to its improved steerability.
Other stents. These early devices led to a much better
understanding of what factors were needed to provide deliverabil-
ity, flexibility, and radial strength. A second wave of coronary
artery stent designs were commercialized more expeditiously due
in part to regulatory approval pathways blazed by the earliest
innovators. For example, whereas the FDA required the Palmaz-
Schatz stent to be tested in the peripheral circulation before being
applied to coronary arteries, this hurdle was not imposed on any
other designs. Independent US-based inventor Dominic Wiktor
developed a stent with Medtronic that was FDA-approved in June
1997. Advanced Vascular Engineering’s stent was approved in
December 1997; the company was subsequently acquired by
Medtronic in 1998. European interventional radiologist Ernst
Strecker developed stents for peripheral use in the 1980s and
partnered with Boston Scientific—which went public in 1992—to
create a self-expanding coronary artery stent (approved late 1998).
More recently, stent innovation has prioritized drug-eluting stents
and bio-absorbable stents, which can be traced to work by Richard
Stack at Duke University in the early 1980s.
Role of individual inventors
We found wide agreement that individual inventors played the
primary role in early development (Table 1). When describing the
origins of this transformative device, respondents commonly
pointed to the key contributions of Drs. Palmaz, Schatz,
Gianturco, Roubin, and Sigwart.
These key innovators (Gianturco was deceased) were early
adopters of coronary artery angioplasty and had first-hand
exposure to clinical problems related to the technique, most
notably post-angioplasty restenosis. Some conceived of the stent as
an alternative to angioplasty, while others viewed it as a way of
preventing abrupt artery closure that occurred after vessel
dissection from treatment with a balloon catheter, which was a
medical emergency. As one inventor noted, ‘‘I found that balloon
angioplasty was unpredictable, and I said we must find some sort
of endoluminal support.’’ Later, use of the stent in preventing
restenosis and increasing the durability of percutaneous revascu-
larization procedures was also realized.
The inventors did substantial work in developing the technol-
ogy. After failing to secure industry partners in the early 1980s,
Palmaz progressed through animal studies himself and filed the
Investigational Device Exemption to begin human testing.
Similarly, Sigwart engaged in prototype development and animal
testing of the Wallstent on his own time.
All of these innovators faced substantial skepticism, particularly
from the medical device industry and grant funding agencies. As
one inventor said, ‘‘People hated the stent; they hated it. It was
incredible. When you would go to a company and would show
them the stent in the early ‘80’s... immediately you can see their
face, they start rolling their eyes, and kind of making scowls. There
was something about stents that everybody disliked.’’ The
Veterans Administration’s rejections of Palmaz’s grant applica-
tions to fund his work compelled him to find private funding
through Romano and Schatz. Despite early reports of stent
thrombosis as high as 24% [24], innovators such as Palmaz and
Schatz remained resolute in the belief that the stent technology
when deployed correctly and with the recommended course of
antithrombotic medication was safe and effective. They were
buoyed by support among their colleagues in the interventional
radiology and cardiology communities, who saw the need and
importance of such a technology, and who provided support and
collaboration.
Role of industry
Most interviewees described the entry of large medical device
companies after stent prototypes had been sufficiently developed
and tested in laboratory and animal trials. Risk was cited as a
primary factor that hindered earlier industry involvement.
According to interviewees, companies believed it was physiolog-
ically incompatible to implant prosthetic material in the coronary
circulation. Companies also had legal concerns. The Bjork-Shiley
mechanical heart valve had been recalled around that time for
safety reasons prompting Pfizer to halt development of Sigwart’s
first stent product. Cook Inc. was concerned about legal risks
related to the potential failure of implantable cardiac devices,
necessitating Roubin to personally seek the initial Investigational
Device Exemption application to begin testing his stent in humans.
Given the invasiveness of the technology, there was also significant
concern regarding the FDA approval process and the ‘‘difficult
regulatory environment.’’ Finally, according to interviewees, many
companies perceived substantial business risks. According to one
inventor, consultants from McKinsey & Co. provided a strong
recommendation to Johnson & Johnson against investing in the
Palmaz-Schatz stent believing the market size to be too small.
When they became involved, medical device companies
provided financial resources and engineering to test design
hypotheses of physician-innovators. The company’s engineers also
supported manufacturability. However, individual inventors
reported that they accounted for ease of manufacturing in their
initial prototype designs. The Palmaz-Schatz laboratory-produced
prototype was essentially manufacture-ready when Johnson &
Johnson became involved.
Second, medical device companies provided necessary support
in organizing clinical trials and negotiating the FDA approval
process. Organizing the randomized trials and FDA premarket
authorizations took 7–8 years to complete. The inventors
Coronary Stent Innovation
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million in the processes leading to device approval, earning
revenues surpassing that investment within a year or two after the
devices were approved. Lastly, device companies provided existing
sales channels to deploy the technology, although innovators
helped convince other clinicians to adopt the technology.
Role of intellectual property
We found that ownership of intellectual property played little
role in incentivizing initial innovation in this field. No key
inventors initially sought out patents after developing their stents
citing a lack of expertise, funding limitations and a philosophical
commitment to research dissemination. Our interviewees each
said that the potential profitability of the resulting products was
not an important consideration.
The key innovators in our study considered themselves
uninformed about patents. One inventor said, ‘‘I was completely
naive in the area and the only thing I wanted was to get the
scaffold into the angioplasty.’’ Another inventor first broached the
subject of patenting with his university, but reports that he was told
by university officers that his work was not patentable. Without
patent protection, an inventor presented his work to the public at a
national conference, later leading to a loss of European rights. A
third inventor did not initially apply for a patent on his work;
rather, intellectual property protection was sought first by the
company he was associated with only after he signed a contract
releasing the technology rights to them.
Patents ultimately became paramount in the context of the
larger corporations that later became involved in stent commer-
cialization. After Palmaz, Schatz, and Romano formed EGP, the
partnership then applied and paid for its own patent [25]. Johnson
& Johnson later expended substantial resources, in the words of
one interviewee, ‘‘expanding the patent limits.’’ The patent record
became crucial as these larger companies engaged in litigation
with one another. By 2002, multiple lawsuits between Johnson &
Johnson, Cordis, Medtronic and Boston Scientific about which
had priority to overlapping designs of their different versions of
coronary artery stents resulted in billions of dollars in damages and
fees [26]. In one judgment, Medtronic and Boston Scientific paid
Johnson & Johnson $1.2 billion for patent infringement on the
Palmaz-Schatz stent.
A lax posture towards patents excluded some inventors and key
contributors from financial rewards. For example, the University
of Texas, which financially supported and provided laboratory
space for important early proof-of-concept experiments conducted
by Palmaz, declined to invest the resources to patent the discovery.
Ultimately, Palmaz offered them a 3% share of his royalties, which
has since led to about $10–$30 million in total payments to the
university. Roubin and Emory University similarly received no
royalties from his work or the testing that occurred in university
laboratories, although Cook later provided Roubin with a
substantial financial gift to recognize his contribution. Without
patents, Sigwart and his institution received no royalties from his
original innovations, even after the technology was sold to Pfizer.
This experience led him to change his approach towards
intellectual property in his subsequent collaboration with ACS.
Other key characteristics of the inventors and inventive
process
Key inventors were all physicians directly exposed to the clinical
problems they were trying to address. Most interviewees specif-
ically remarked on these inventors’ aptitude and vision, such as
their ability to recognize potential innovative solutions to emerging
clinical problems such as coronary artery restenosis. Interviewees
Table 1. Representative Quotations in Key Subject Areas.
Thematic area Illustrative remarks
Motivation ‘‘My involvement was driven purely and simply by a clinical imperative at the time.’’ [Physician-innovator]
‘‘It was clear … that we had a huge shortcoming with [Gruentzig’s] method and that was his acute closure that led to
tremendous amount of myocardial infarction emergency surgery.’’ [Physician-innovator]
‘‘I felt very strongly being an operator. I wasn’t just an inventor. I was an operator.’’ [Physician-innovator]
Obstacles to progress ‘‘We had to be very hard headed to accept all that rejection because it was systematic and relentless.’’ [Physician-innovator]
Contributors to early success ‘‘We spent a lot more time on the design and a lot more time proving that it worked. All the others were just kind of wham-
bam. ‘Let’s get it out there as fast as we can’ but without any data.’’ [Physician-innovator]
‘‘We are more aggressive with filing patents today than we were back then, but in those days, we didn’t file any patents. We just
kept our nose to the grindstone and kept things moving.’’ [Company-based innovator]
Risk and investment ‘‘When the thing is disruptive and totally outlandish, the companies stay away from it.’’ [Physician-innovator]
‘‘My first reaction when I was told what it was and what I should be thinking about designing was well that’s a stupid idea.
We’ve got diseased arteries that are full of stuff already, why would we want to put in a piece of a metal that’s going to be
lifetime liability for us?’’ [Company-based innovator]
Collaboration ‘‘So many, many months and changes and design went by working with the engineers from [company]’’ [Physician-innovator]
‘‘From an engineering product development perspective, they are extraordinary.’’ [Physician-innovator]
‘‘When [company] took over we just basically showed the engineers what we wanted and that was it.’’ [Physician-innovator]
‘‘I mean he had a lot of clinical issues that he saw that needed to be solved and he needed some help in doing that, and we
helped him in any way we could. It was just a nice partnership.’’ [Company-based innovator]
Role of intellectual property ‘‘The impetus was to publish and it seems quaint now and maybe stupid, but we didn’t give much thought to patenting.’’
[Physician-innovator]
‘‘The patents of course are critical because no company wants to invest unless they have some IP.’’ [Company-based innovator]
‘‘In those days, we were for a couple of years the number one patenting company in the nation, if not the world.’’ [Company-
based innovator]
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0088664.t001
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resistance from the medical community. Another common quality
was that inventors were seen as risk-takers, in contrast to the
widespread perceptions that the companies were risk-averse.
Interestingly, a background in engineering was not necessary. All
individual inventors were able to directly develop prototypes from
raw materials and deploy them on animals.
Collaborative work was central to the early development
process. For the Palmaz-Schatz and Gianturco-Roubin stents,
each inventor brought different contributions to building the
device. Interviewees cited the importance of collaborations
between the academic inventors and their colleagues in medical
device companies for engineering support. Other unofficial
collaborations also helped move the development process forward.
For example, Palmaz received early assistance from an engineer
not affiliated with his academic medical center in learning about
certain manufacturing processes such as laser etching that he could
use to produce a prototype of his stent concept [27]. Interviewees
also recalled the inventors discussing their work at national
professional meetings, and the importance of these open brain-
storming sessions in facilitating progress of the individual projects.
Discussion
Consistent with other single-perspective historical analyses of
coronary artery stents [28,29], our qualitative study found that
much of the work in developing coronary stents was pioneered by
individual inventors, not only in generating ideas in the face of
substantial skepticism, but also in prototype development and
early testing. These individual inventors were motivated by the
desire to address a pressing clinical problem to which they had
direct exposure.
Their work was facilitated by supportive atmospheres within
academic or other research environments that allowed freedom for
collaborations and provided resources for proof-of-concept testing.
Larger companies became involved at a later stage, contributing
manufacturing support, resources for broad clinical testing, and
regulatory approval.
Our findings suggest a conceptual model in which transforma-
tive medical device innovation arose from three primary factors:
(1) unmet clinical need, (2) independent innovators with the
insight, motivation, and ability to address that need, and (3)
support that allowed the innovators to push their solutions past
skepticism and through proof-of-concept testing. In the case of
coronary artery stents, the clinical imperative arose from
complications of the emergence of balloon angioplasty, as well as
from the desire to apply existing experimentation with peripheral
artery stents to relieve coronary artery blockages. The fact that
many of the key innovators were physicians who could draw on
their direct experience with patients turned out to be central to
recognizing and addressing this clinical need. In the early stages of
development, innovators received their primary support from
academic research centers and mentors, from small companies
with close ties to innovative researchers, and in the case of the
Palmaz-Schatz stent, from a forward-thinking angel investor with
no pre-existing ties to the medical industry [30].
It is widely argued that there is a positive association between
profit expectation and innovative activity [31]. However, most of
the key inventors of coronary artery stents reported to us that they
did not have any profit expectations, and in fact did not initially
seek out patents. Indeed, many of these innovators openly shared
their work with colleagues, as well as in publications and at
national meetings. In some cases, this led to design improvements.
In others, there was a direct loss of patent rights in certain
jurisdictions.
In the case of device development, industry representatives have
often referred to themselves as the primary sources of new
products [22]. Others point to the primacy of small companies in
the device innovation process [32]. However, the evidence we
have collected indicates that individual innovators supported by
academic medical centers were the primary source of development
for this transformative device. Academic physicians did not just
generate the ideas, or conduct basic research that would lay the
groundwork for subsequent discoveries. They completed prototype
development and conducted clinical testing up to the point of
initial FDA approval of human trials.
Given the perception of the innovators we spoke with that
established companies and venture capitalists were—and re-
main—generally risk-averse regarding highest risk and most
innovative medical technology, funding for such work outside of
these channels is critical. Thus, supporting basic research in new
devices through the NIH and facilitating the efforts of innovators
who seek to move their discoveries out of the academic setting are
likely to have the greatest impact in generating breakthrough
discoveries. Government funding for science has slowed in recent
years, and faces substantial budget cuts in the future as well [33].
By contrast, policies that have been proposed or enacted in recent
years—adjusting FDA regulatory practices or providing additional
resources to large manufacturers, such as by repealing the excise
tax on approved medical devices in the 2010 Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act—are unlikely to have a substantial
impact on breakthrough discoveries, despite the claims made by
proponents of these strategies [34].
In addition, the primacy of physician-innovators in our study
reinforces the need to foster relationships between academic
researchers and device industry that can facilitate uptake of
transformative ideas and prototypes [35,36]. As one physician-
innovator noted, ‘‘The first thing we do when we get a great idea
now is get it outside [the academic setting] and get it
commercialized.’’ Physician-innovators with existing relationships
with companies were able to more speedily advance their work
(Gianturco/Roubin and Cook Inc.) as compared to those who did
not (Palmaz). To attract industry interest, Palmaz had to
demonstrate more clinical efficacy in animal studies and human
case studies than did the innovators allied with Cook Inc., who
already had a longstanding relationship.
Finally, we found that patents played a limited role in the
innovation of the coronary artery stent. Notably, in recent years,
physician-innovators and academic medical centers have shown
greater propensity towards obtaining patents [37]. Some reports
have suggested that the proliferation of patents might be hindering
transformative innovation [38], and provided specific examples
where this has been the case in the medical device market [39].
Innovators in our sample pointed to current-day patenting trends
as harmful to the essential collaborative relationships they
developed during their work on coronary artery stents, and
blamed these trends on certain university technology transfer
offices seeking greater control over patent rights or insisting on
burdensome licensing agreements [40]. There remains significant
uncertainty regarding the ownership of patentable improvements
on original designs licensed from different parties. Many licensing
agreements clearly specify ownership relating to improvements.
However, inattention to patents in the stent case also hindered the
protection of the technology. Further research is required to
determine whether increased attention to patents and revenue
generation on the part of physician-innovators and academic
research centers today does indeed contribute to reduced
Coronary Stent Innovation
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facilitate the continued development of transformative medical
technologies.
Author Contributions
Conceived and designed the experiments: ASK JA. Performed the
experiments: ASK SX. Analyzed the data: ASK SX. Wrote the paper:
ASK SX. Reviewed manuscript for content: JA.
References
1. (10 Sept 2011) Left to their own devices: Medtronic and the woes of America’s
medical-technology industry. The Economist.
2. Food and Drug Administration (2004) Innovation or stagnation: challenge and
opportunity on the critical path to new medical products. Available: http://
www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/CriticalPathInitiative/
CriticalPathOpportunitiesReports/ucm077262.htm#intro. Accessed 20 Janu-
ary 2014.
3. National Research Council (2001) Innovation and Invention in Medical Devices:
Workshop Summary. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. 92 p.
4. Krucoff MW, Brindis RG, Hodgson PK, Mack MJ, Holmes DR Jr. (2012)
Medical device innovation: prospective solutions for an ecosystem in crisis:
adding a professional society perspective. JACC Cardiovasc Interv 5: 790–796.
5. Mueller RL, Sanborn TA (1995) The history of interventional cardiology:
cardiac catheterization, angioplasty, and related interventions. Amer Heart J
129: 146–172.
6. Committee Staff House of Representatives Committee on Energy and
Commerce (14 October 2011) Internal memorandum. Available: http://
energycommerce.house.gov/media/file/PDFs/101411tenwaysmemo.pdf.
Accessed 20 January 2014.
7. Kramer DB, Kesselheim AS (2012) Food and Drug Administration Safety and
Innovation Act of 2012: user fees and beyond. New Engl J Med 367: 1277–1279.
8. Mike ´ V, Krauss AN, Ross GS (1996) Doctors and the health industry: a case
study of transcutaneous oxygen monitoring in neonatal intensive care. Soc Sci
Med 42: 1247–1258.
9. Chatterji AK, Fabrizio KR, Mitchell W, Schulman KA (2008) Physician-
industry cooperation in the medical device industry. Health Aff 27: 1532–1543.
10. Xu S, Avorn J, Kesselheim AS (2012) Origins of medical innovation: the case of
coronary artery stents. Circ Cardiovasc Qual Outcomes 5: 743–749.
11. Bar-Shalom A, Cook-Deegan R (2002) Patents and innovation in cancer
therapeutics: lessons from CellPro. Milbank Q 80: 637–676.
12. Peterson ED, Lansky AJ, Anstrom KJ (2000) Evolving trends in interventional
device use and outcomes: results from the National Cardiovascular Network
Database. Amer Heart J 139: 198–207.
13. Nabel EG, Braunwald E (2012) A tale of coronary artery disease and myocardial
infarction. New Engl J Med 366: 54–63.
14. Fuchs VR, Sox HC Jr. (2001) Physicians’ views of the relative importance of
thirty medical innovations. Health Aff 2030–42.
15. Shih C, Berliner E (2008) Diffusion of new technology and payment policies:
coronary stents. Health Aff 27: 1566–76.
16. Miles MB, Huberman AM (1994) Qualitative data analysis: an expanded
sourcebook. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 325 p.
17. Constas MA (1992) Qualitative data analysis as a public event: the
documentation of category development procedures. Am Educ Res J 29: 253–
266.
18. Bradley EH, Holmboe ES, Mattera JA, Roumanis SA, Radford MJ, et al. (2001)
A qualitative study of increasing beta-blocker use after myocardial infarction:
Why do some hospitals succeed? JAMA 285: 2604–2611.
19. Willms DG, Best JA, Taylor DW, Gilbert JR, Wilson DMC, et al. (1990)
A systematic approach for using qualitative methods in primary prevention
research. Medical Anthro Q 4: 391–409.
20. Monagan D (2007) Journey into the heart. New York, NY: Gotham Books. 386
p.
21. Wallace S (1996) Cesare Gianturco (1905–1995): a legend in his own time.
Cardiovasc Intervent Radiology 19: 59–61.
22. Geddes LA, Geddes LE (1993) The catheter introducers. Chicago: Mobium
Press. 147 p.
23. Sigwart U, Puel J, Mirkovitch V, Joffre F, Kappenberger L (1987) Intravascular
stents to prevent occlusion and restenosis after transluminal angioplasty. New
Engl J Med 316: 701–706.
24. Serruys PW, Strauss BH, Beatt KJ, Bertrand ME, Puel J, et al. (1991)
Angiographic follow-up after placement of a self-expanding coronary-artery
stent. N Engl J Med 324(1): 13–17.
25. Expandable Grafts Partnership (7 November 1985) Expandable intraluminal
vascular graft has tube formed of thin rectangular section bars which expand to
fit lumen Patent number 4733665.
26. Feder BJ (4 October 2007) Keeping the arteries cleared and the courts clogged.
NY Times.
27. Editor (6 May 2004) An Expert Interview With Dr. Julio Palmaz: Part I —
Serendipity and the Stent. Medscape Radiology. Available: http://www.
medscape.com/viewarticle/474644. Accessed 20 January 2014.
28. Ruygrok PN, Serruys PW (1996) Intracoronary stenting: from concept to
custom. Circulation 94: 882–890.
29. Sigwart U (1997) Endovascular stents. Sci & Med 4: 16–25.
30. Ackerly DC, Valverde AM, Diener LW, Dossary KL, Schulman KA (2009)
Fueling innovation in medical devices (and beyond): venture capital in health
care. Health Aff 28: w68–75.
31. Schmookler J (1966) Invention and economic growth. Cambridge MA: Harvard
University Press. 332 p.
32. Kahn A (1991) The Dynamics of Medical Device Innovation: An Innovator’s
Perspective. In: A.C Gelijns, A Halm, editors. The Changing Economics of
Medical Technology. National Academy Press, Washington DC. pp. 89–95.
33. Malakoff D (2012) Sequestration would cut U.S. science budgets by 8.2%, White
House estimates. Science Insider. Available: http://news.sciencemag.org/
scienceinsider/2012/09/sequestration-would-cut-us-scien.html. Accessed 20
January 2014.
34. Paulsen E, Altmire J (6 June 2012) New tax will hurt medical device innovation.
The Hill. Available: http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/healthcare/
231199-new-tax-will-hurt-medical-device-innovation. Accessed 20 January
2014.
35. Privitera MB, Design M, Johnson J (2009) Interconnections of basic science
research and product development in medical device design. Conf Proc IEEE
Eng Med Biol Soc 2009: 5595–5598.
36. Roberts EB (1988) Technological Innovation and Medical Devices. In: Ekelman
KB, editor. New Medical Devices: Invention, Development, and Use.
Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press. pp. 35–48.
37. Azoulay P, Michigan R, Sampat BN (2007) The anatomy of medical school
patenting. New Engl J Med 357: 2049–2056.
38. Heller MA, Eisenberg RS (1998) Can patents deter innovation: the antic-
ommons in biomedical research. Science 280: 698–701.
39. Erdin N, Robin F, Heinemann L, Brandt D, Hovorka R (2008) Further
development of artificial pancreas: blocked by patents? J Diabetes Sci Technol 2:
971–976.
40. Kesselheim AS, Rajkumar R (2011) Who owns federally funded research? The
Supreme Court and the Bayh-Dole Act. New Engl J Med 365: 1167–1169.
Coronary Stent Innovation
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 February 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 2 | e88664